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Abstract/Resumo: 
Globalization and technological innovations create investment opportunities for firms worldwide. In fact, 
while firms pursue foreign direct investment (FDI) opportunities on a global basis, countries compete to 
attract these flows. Investment decisions by firms depend on complex and distinct factors. In particular, in 
the case of foreign investment one of these factors relates to the perception that investors have about the 
level of risk and/or corruption (or transparency) that characterises countries. Recent studies suggest that 
corruption negatively impacts on FDI and may act as a disincentive to investment. 
 
By using information for 97 countries, concerning inward FDI performance and perceived level of 
corruption, this paper intends to analyse how corruption influences on the FDI. Given that a certain level of 
perceived corruption can, in fact, be subject to different subjective evaluations by investors, the paper uses 
a fuzzy logic approach in order to determine conceivable clusters in the FDI-corruption space. 
 
The use of fuzzy clustering techniques reveals the existence of two well-defined clusters: one is formed by 
high-level corruption countries, where, indeed, corruption is negatively correlated, in a significant way, with 
FDI; the other is formed by low-level corruption countries, where the influence of corruption on FDI is not so 
evident. 
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 1. Introduction and Motivation 
 
For a number of reasons, the existence of transparent economic policies is an essential aspect for 
investors, especially for foreigners. A first reason results from the fact that the inexistence of transparency 
imposes supplementary costs to the firms, generally associated to the lack of available information about 
activities or even future intentions of some governmental departments, in special in relation to the policies 
of privatizations. Corruption also provokes supplementary costs to the firms, namely the ones that result 
from bribery,1 despite being impossible to determine its effective economic cost. Thus, the selection of 
investment in what concerns the place of destination is, sometimes, biased because of elements of non-
economic nature, particularly pressures, contacts and rent-seeking alliances. In short, the existence of a 
steady and actively legal framework against the corruption and the bribery can, in fact, represent a factor of 
attractiveness for foreign investments. 
 
One second argument on the importance of transparent economic policies to the foreign investment has to 
do with the fact that those are able to facilitate the processes of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. In 
effect, the practice of the national entities that watch over for the firms competition, can promote 
discretionary acts, making impracticable many foreign investment projects based upon acquisitions. See, 
for instance, Neven et al. (1998). 
 
Related to the competition policies is the fact that investors usually demand a steady and transparent legal 
framework in relation to the protection of the intellectual property rights (IPR). Plainly, taking into account 
the great importance of the intensity of the technology transfer in the scope of the multinationals activities, 
this reason becomes intuitive, whereas being also supported by some empirical literature. In effect, Lee / 
Mansfield (1996) and Smith (2001) found positive correlation between the strength of IPR protection and 
                                                     
1
 Kaufmann et al. (1999), on the basis of estimates obtained through branch offices of multinationals in diverse 
countries, concluded that the weight of the activities related to bribery in the GDP of countries as Albania, Latvia or 
Georgia varied between 7% and 15%. 
the volume of U.S. FDI, being particularly significant in industrial activities with high intensity in R&D. 
One another argument in favour of the transparency of the economic policies is related to its impact in 
business attitudes. Basically the literature recognises that firms take their decisions about external 
investment conditionally on their perception on ‘fundamentals’, which includes different macroeconomic 
variables as inflation, the perspectives of growth or the situation of the balance of payments.2 In this 
context, the existence of clear and predictable economic policies associated with liberalizing regimes of 
trade and investment are potent (robust) instruments in the way to attract FDI flows (Drabek / Payne 
(2001)). 
 
Finally, there is a basic reason for the association of transparent economic policies and reduced corruption, 
which results from the fact that the performance of these elements is often becoming accurately 
monitorised by international entities and rating agencies. In fact, these organizations have been publishing, 
in an increasing rhythm, country rankings, this information on countries dynamics and economic 
performances having a real impact on the investors’ decisions. The empirical test that we perform in this 
paper is based on the relationship that is to exist between the country performances in terms of FDI 
attraction and the perception of the degree of corruption in a given moment of time. 
 
Corruption is commonly considered as the misuse of public power for private benefit, thus affecting all the 
society, in special the less well-off stratus, and, in a well-known way, hampers business activity and 
economic development. In this way, corruption provokes a deregulation in the functioning of the market 
economies, distorts the processes of decision and, by this way, affects the rationality and the economic 
efficiency. Corruption becomes particularly significant in emergent or less developed economies (Wilhelm 
(2002)), resulting from the inexistence of a preventive legal framework, and having as a consequence, 
among others, a reduced effectiveness of the received international aid and the efficient allocation of 
domestic and external resources (Transparency International (2000)). 
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 See Hoekman / Saggi (1999) for a survey on the literature. 
 The questions related to corruption were during many years almost completely ignored by the relevant 
international business literature, not deserving great attention, in particular in the context of the theoretical 
approaches to the motivations and behaviours of the multinational corporations.3 However, quite recently, 
these issues started to be considered an important aspect for the international business community, having 
been subject to some research (Gordon / Miyake (2001) and Celentani et al. (2004)). 
 
The so-called OLI Dunning’s (1988) paradigm constitutes a milestone reference in the theoretical and 
empirical approaches of the FDI. This paradigm is called as Eclectic because it bases the decision of the 
company in relation to their approach to the foreign markets in the fact that in each situation the company 
and countries (home and destination) should have, or not, three types of advantages: Ownership (O), 
Location (L) and Internalization (I). In this context, the firm decides to invest in a foreign country when, 
simultaneously, it possesses Ownership, Internalization and Location advantages. 
 
The existence of ownership advantages reveals to be a basic condition so that the firm can explore it in any 
market. Moreover, the choice of the localization is conditional on the existence of structural market 
imperfections or from specific factor endowments, being particularly relevant for the firm, the risk that it 
incurs when dislocating to an ‘unknown’ market. Finally, firms internalize their markets of intermediate 
goods, whenever the existing costs of transaction in the markets surpass the coordination costs that the 
company supports for the internal accomplishment of this type of activities. 
 
Later, under the light of the recent transformations in the international scenario, the economic and financial 
globalization it comes to recognize the necessity of a greater degree of firms competitiveness. Thus, the 
introduction of the concept of “Capitalism of Alliances”, based in the mutual trust, commitments and the 
contractual obligations between partners, widens the original scope of the OLI Paradigm (Dunning (1995)). 
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 As Boddewyn / Brewer (1994) recognise. 
In this sense, mutual trust may be a decisive instrumental issue for the potential success of the companies. 
Consequently, the inclusion of corruption issues turned to be considered in an explicit form, given its 
impacts on the confidence level of the agents. See Voyer / Beamish (2004). 
 
The clarifying and analytical potential of the OLI Paradigm has been important to understand the 
multinationals behaviour, its usefulness being able to be strengthened by the inclusion of the notion of 
corruption and its impacts on FDI. In fact, taking into account the existence of corruption, which basically 
affects the Location dimension, the firms will try to reduce the degree of uncertainty associated with its 
entrance in a foreign market.4 
 
Plainly, the investment decisions by firms depend on complex and distinct factors. In particular, in the case 
of foreign investment one of those factors relates to the perception that the investors have about the level 
of risk and/or corruption that characterises the countries. Further to the question: Why is the CPI based on 
perceptions only?, the Transparency International, itself, recognises that it is difficult to base comparative 
statements on the levels of corruption in different countries on hard empirical data. This clearly opens the 
field for an application of fuzzy logic, given its characteristics. 
 
As is well-known, since the seminal paper of Zadeh (1965), fuzzy logic has undergone a tremendous 
growth, both in theoretical and applied fields. Far from being a surprise, despite the delay, a considerable 
number of applications of fuzzy logic in diverse fields of economics have been made; see, for instance, 
Bagnoli / Smith (1998) on real estate valuation or Draeseke / Giles (1999) on underground economy or 
Landajo (2000) on forecasting. The diversity of these applications is indeed a characteristic that indicates 
the richness of fuzzy logic. As fuzzy logic allows ‘intermediate’ values to be defined between conventional 
or crisp evaluations like yes/no, or true/false, the vagueness or subjectivity of concepts which it is believed 
characterise human thought is, thus, (more) easily taken into account. Hence, some other applications of 
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 See Rodriguez et al. (2005) and Doh et al. (2003). 
fuzzy logic which take into account this characteristic of human reasoning have also been made. See, for 
instance, West / Linster (2003) on game theory or Caleiro (2005) on the relationship between confidence 
and unemployment. 
 
Notwithstanding the above mentioned applications, given that one of the main concerns of fuzzy logic is to 
capture approximate rather than exact forms of reasoning, and this also characterises many economic 
situations, such as forming intrinsically subjective measures of risk, confidence, well-being, satisfaction, 
etc., it is surprising that, to the best of our knowledge, so very few applications of fuzzy logic have been 
made in modelling how perceived corruption influences the decisions of investors, which are crucial for a 
certain level of FDI. 
 
Due to incomplete information, economic agents, namely investors, may be characterised by a certain level 
of willingness to invest given a vague perception of the economic situation which, indeed, is generally 
measured by a reasonable amount of objective measures. That willingness to invest is a concept which 
cannot be defined precisely. This means that, when looking at the economic situation, even if all the 
information provided by those objective measures could be fully exploited, agents may still base their 
judgements on subjective criteria such as ‘high’ or ‘large’, ‘normal’ or ‘mean’ and ‘low’ or ‘small’ values for 
those objective variables. If this is the case, a fuzzy logic approach rather than a crisp one is (much) more 
appropriate. In fact, if one assumes that agents do not possess the ability to acquire, retain and process all 
the information needed to make crisp decisions as, for example, to sharply classify observed measures of 
corruption or risk as high, normal or low, and base their willingness to invest on that, then fuzzy logic is a 
natural way of dealing with this kind of situation in which the source of imprecision is the absence of crisp 
or rigid defined criteria of class memberships due to states of incomplete or imperfect knowledge. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the methodological aspects related to the 
data and the fuzzy logic technique. Section 3 analyses how corruption exerts influence on the FDI. Given 
that a certain level of perceived corruption can, in fact, be subject to different subjective evaluations by 
investors, the paper uses a fuzzy logic approach in order to determine conceivable clusters in the space 
FDI-corruption. Section 4 concludes. 
 
  2. Methodological issues 
 
In this section we briefly present the methodological aspects related to the data and to the technique used 
in the paper. 
 
 2.1. The data 
In what concerns the data, it will be considered an inward FDI performance index for the period 2001-2003 
and a perception corruption index for the period 2000-2002.5 See the appendix. The Inward FDI 
Performance Index ranks countries by the FDI they receive relative to their economic size. It is the ratio of a 
country’s share in global FDI inflows to its share in global GDP, that is 
w
i
w
i
GDP
GDP
FDI
FDI
iIND =  
where INDi is the inward FDI performance index of the i-th country, FDIi is the FDI inflows in the i-th 
country, FDIw is the world FDI inflows, GDPi is the GDP in the i-th country and GDPw is the world GDP. A 
value greater than one thus indicates that the country receives more FDI than its relative economic size, a 
value below one that it receives less (a negative value means that foreign investors disinvest in that 
period). The index thus captures the influence on FDI of factors other than market size, assuming that, 
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 Given that corruption is expected to exert influence on the investment decision but in a lagged way, this justifies 
the lag on the periods. 
other things being equal, size is the ‘base line’ for attracting investment. These other factors can be 
diverse, ranging from the business climate, economic and political stability, the presence of natural 
resources, infrastructure, skills and technologies, to opportunities for participating in privatization or the 
effectiveness of FDI promotion. 
 
Concerning the corruption data, in accordance to the Transparency International organization, the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks the countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is 
perceived to exist among public officials and politicians.6 It is a composite index, derived from 15 different 
polls and surveys from nine independent institutions carried out among business people and country 
analysts, including surveys of both residents and expatriates, both business people and risk analysts. The 
index provides a snapshot of the views of decision-makers, who take key decisions on investment and 
trade [italics added].  
 
 
 2.2. The fuzzy logic approach 
 
Given that the purposes of the paper will be mainly achieved by the use of fuzzy clustering techniques, it is 
illuminating to start with a general discussion of this technique. 
 
Consider U  to be a universal set and A  being a subset of U in the classical sense, that is UA ⊆ . 
Following the logic of crisp sets, the degree to which an element of U  belongs to A  is either 0 or 1. In 
other words, the characteristic function of A , { }1,0: →UAµ , being defined as ( ) 1=xAµ  for Ax ∈ , and 
( ) 0=xAµ  for Ax ∉ , thus discriminates respectively between members and non-members of the crisp 
set. The generalisation to a fuzzy set is made by relaxing the strict separation between elements belonging 
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 Note that the CPI takes values in the interval [1,10] and that a lower value means a higher level of perceived 
corruption. 
or not to A , allowing the degree of belonging/membership to take more than these two values, typically by 
allowing any value in the closed interval [0,1]. See, for instance, Zimmermann (1991) or Chen (1996). 
 
The values then assigned by the membership function of a fuzzy set to the elements in the universal set 
indicate the membership grade or degree of adherence of each element in the set. Larger (smaller) values 
naturally indicate higher (lower) membership grades, degrees, or consistency between an element of the 
set and the full characteristics that the set describes.7 Hence, using fuzzy logic, one can deal with 
reasoning like: ‘the observed value for the corruption perception index, say 5, can be considered high, 
normal or low with some degrees of membership’. 
 
In terms of fuzzy logic, ‘high’, ‘normal’ or ‘low’ values (for the variable under question) can be considered to 
be subjective categories, as economic agents often evaluate those concepts differently. In what follows, it 
will be assumed that investors consider to be relevant their relative perception of corruption (in accordance 
to some subjective categories) for their willingness to invest, therefore assuming an approximate or 
qualitative reasoning. 
 
In the particular case of this paper, we will use this kind of fuzzy logic reasoning to construct clusters in the 
space (FDI, Corruption). This partition of the space can also be done in, say, a traditional/crisp way. The 
crisp/hard clusters algorithm tries to locate clusters in a multi-dimensional data space, U, such that each 
point or observation is assigned in that space to a particular cluster in accordance to a given criterion. 
Considering c clusters, the hard cluster technique is then based on a c-partition of the data space U into a 
family of clusters such that the set of clusters exhausts the whole universe, that a cluster can neither be 
empty nor contain all data samples, and that none of the clusters overlap. 
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 Although many authors defend that membership defines the degree of adherence rather than the probability of an 
event, some others consider that the membership function may be considered akin to a subjective probability 
distribution. See, for instance, Chang / Stekler (1977). 
Formally, the hard c-means algorithm finds a centre in each cluster, minimising an objective function of a 
distance measure. The objective function depends on the (Euclidean) distances between data vectors uk (k 
= 1, 2,…, K) and cluster centres ci. The partitioned clusters are typically defined by a c × K binary 
characteristic matrix M, called the membership matrix, where each element mik is 1 if the kth data point uk 
belongs to cluster i, and 0 otherwise. Since a data point can only belong to one cluster, the membership 
matrix M has the properties: (i) the sum of each column is one, and (ii) the sum of all elements is K. 
 
The fuzzy c-means differs from hard c-means because it employs fuzzy partitioning, where a point can 
belong to several clusters with degrees of membership such that the membership matrix M is allowed to 
have elements in the range [0,1]. A point’s total membership to all clusters, however, must always be equal 
to unity. In this sense, despite that, in formal terms, none of the fuzzy clusters overlap, the fact is that, in 
general, each data point is assigned to every cluster, although with different degrees of membership. 
Generally speaking, in visual terms, each data point is then associated to the particular cluster to which its 
degree of membership is higher. 
 
 3. How is FDI influenced by corruption? 
 
In this section we analyse a possible influence of corruption on FDI. Figure 1 plots the data and at the 
same time shows the results from the fuzzy clustering technique.8 
 
Plainly, there are two well-defined clusters (identified in figure 1 by the dotted circles and empty circles, 
whose centres are given by the black crosses), one being associated with the higher level of perceived 
corruption countries and another associated with the lower level perceived corruption countries.9 In fact, the 
splitting of the countries clearly reflects the CPI values as it seams possible to separate the two groups of 
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 The fuzzy clustering technique was applied by the resource to the fuzzy toolbox in MATLAB. 
 
9
 Again note that the higher is the CPI index the ‘cleaner’ is the country. 
countries in accordance to a, say, critical level of perceived corruption around 5,6. 
 
Fig. 1 – The fuzzy clustering results 
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In accordance to the fuzzy clustering methodology, the fact that a particular given is associated to a 
particular cluster does not mean, in general, that its degree of membership to the other(s) cluster(s) is 
zero.10 Figure 2 adds to figure 1 by explicitly showing the membership values to cluster 1 (the one identified 
by the dotted circles in figure 1).11 
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 In fact, the association of a country to a particular cluster simply means that the degree of membership to that 
cluster is the highest among all the membership values, i.e. for all clusters, of that country. 
 
11
 Obviously, the membership degrees to cluster 2 (identified by the empty circles in figure 1) are the complement to 
1 of those concerning cluster 1. See the appendix.  
Fig. 2 – The membership degrees 
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Given the results of the fuzzy clustering, a natural way of proceeding is to verify how the corruption 
influences the FDI in the two clusters. Clearly for the cluster of higher perceived level of corruption, there is 
a significant influence of this factor on the FDI performance. The estimated slope for a straight line relating 
the two variables is of the magnitude 0.414 with an associated level of the t-student statistic of 9.497. For 
the cluster of less perceived corruption countries, the influence of corruption on the FDI is clearly not so 
evident – in fact, the slope of the straight line gets a t-student statistic of 0.215 – indicating that for a 
sufficiently low level of perceived corruption, other factors rather than corruption are certainly (more) 
relevant for the FDI.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  4. Conclusions and directions for further research 
To conclude we would like to stress the main lesson from our paper as a policy implication. In order not to 
be considered less attractive for foreign investors and, therefore, be penalised by that, countries do indeed 
benefit from increased levels of transparency in order to escape from the cluster of countries where 
perceived levels of corruption are higher. In other words, policy makers should make sure that their policies 
are transparent enough for potential foreign investors. After escaping from that cluster, the objective of 
attracting higher levels of FDI has to be crucially obtained by the use of other measures. 
 
In the context of Dunning’s work, we could understand the results of our empirical research as supporting 
the inclusion of corruption in the set of the relevant elements for the location tier. See Dunning (1988,1995). 
 
Given that (perceived) corruption reflects a variety of factors – which are clear even in the way the CPI data 
is obtained – an interesting issue to be further explored is the analysis of the specific factors or components 
that assume a more significant role on the attraction of FDI flows. 
 
An analysis of the dynamics of the components of corruption or even of corruption itself seems to be a 
quite plausible improvement as the direction assumed by policy makers towards more transparent policies 
may have a marginal impact on the attraction of FDI much more evident than one may expect by the 
analysis of the absolute position of corruption.12 Plainly, the more those measures are assumed to be 
credible by foreign investors, the more that can be the case.  
Finally, we consider this paper as a promising starting point for the analysis of the factors that reveal to be 
essential for FDI, either in an inward perspective or in an outward perspective, both in performance and 
potential measures. The combination of all these perspectives, in a dynamic way, is to be considered in 
future studies. 
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 Interestingly, the fact that the direction may be more important than the position is another reason for making it 
adequate to use fuzzy logic techniques. See Caleiro (2005). 
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 Appendix 
 
 
CPI Inward FDI Membership degree  
2000-2002 2001-2003 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
Albania 2,5 1,714 0,9796 0,0204 
Argentina 2,8 0,346 0,9584 0,0416 
Australia 8,6 1,012 0,0418 0,9582 
Austria 7,8 1,046 0,026 0,974 
Bangladesh 1,2 0,083 0,8932 0,1068 
Belarus 4,8 0,570 0,7621 0,2379 
Bolivia 2,2 4,062 0,8149 0,1851 
Botswana 6,4 1,440 0,1651 0,8349 
Brazil 4,0 1,670 0,9489 0,0511 
Bulgaria 4,0 3,291 0,7899 0,2101 
Cameroon 2,2 0,750 0,9606 0,0394 
Canada 9,0 1,177 0,0521 0,9479 
Chile 7,5 2,161 0,0107 0,9893 
China 3,5 1,969 0,9749 0,0251 
Colombia 3,6 1,317 0,9899 0,0101 
Costa Rica 4,5 1,659 0,8547 0,1453 
Ivory Coast 2,7 1,220 0,9907 0,0093 
Croatia 3,8 3,423 0,7996 0,2004 
Czech Republic 3,7 3,900 0,7584 0,2416 
Denmark 9,5 1,896 0,0681 0,9319 
Dominican Republic 3,5 1,938 0,9768 0,0232 
Ecuador 2,2 2,845 0,911 0,089 
Egypt 3,4 0,265 0,9453 0,0547 
El Salvador 3,4 0,849 0,9848 0,0152 
Estonia 5,6 4,149 0,4297 0,5703 
Ethiopia 3,5 0,399 0,9518 0,0482 
Finland 9,7 1,718 0,0791 0,9209 
France 6,3 1,606 0,1865 0,8135 
Georgia 2,4 2,882 0,9119 0,0881 
Germany 7,3 0,554 0,0925 0,9075 
Ghana 3,9 0,743 0,9472 0,0528 
Greece 4,2 0,193 0,8651 0,1349 
Guatemala 2,5 0,570 0,9645 0,0355 
Haiti 2,2 0,080 0,9295 0,0705 
Honduras 2,7 1,416 0,9912 0,0088 
Hong Kong, China 8,2 4,822 0,1996 0,8004 
Hungary 4,9 2,296 0,6905 0,3095 
Iceland 9,4 0,834 0,0833 0,9167 
India 2,7 0,357 0,9577 0,0423 
Indonesia 1,9 -0,324 0,8976 0,1024 
Ireland 6,9 7,897 0,4012 0,5988 
Israel 7,3 1,374 0,0242 0,9758 
Italy 5,2 0,605 0,6353 0,3647 
Jamaica 4,0 3,419 0,7752 0,2248 
Japan 7,1 0,087 0,1673 0,8327 
Jordan 4,5 0,941 0,857 0,143 
Kazakhstan 2,3 4,897 0,7493 0,2507 
Kenya 1,9 0,152 0,9236 0,0764 
Latvia 3,7 1,760 0,9747 0,0253 
Lithuania 4,8 1,517 0,772 0,228 
Madagascar 1,7 0,483 0,9293 0,0707 
Malawi 2,9 0,448 0,9658 0,0342 
Malaysia 4,9 1,079 0,7439 0,2561 
Mexico 3,6 1,373 0,99 0,01 
Moldova 2,1 3,124 0,8887 0,1113 
Morocco 3,7 2,413 0,9252 0,0748 
Namibia 5,7 3,472 0,3974 0,6026 
Netherlands 9,0 3,655 0,1112 0,8888 
New Zealand 9,5 1,261 0,0747 0,9253 
Nicaragua 2,5 3,524 0,8575 0,1425 
Nigeria 1,6 1,187 0,9389 0,0611 
Norway 8,5 0,452 0,0742 0,9258 
Pakistan 2,6 0,668 0,972 0,028 
Panama 3,0 1,692 0,9939 0,0061 
Paraguay 1,7 0,480 0,9292 0,0708 
Peru 4,0 1,358 0,9554 0,0446 
Philippines 2,6 0,675 0,9723 0,0277 
Poland 4,0 1,188 0,9541 0,0459 
Portugal 6,3 1,135 0,2132 0,7868 
Romania 2,6 1,367 0,9879 0,0121 
Russia 2,7 0,322 0,9555 0,0445 
Senegal 3,1 0,525 0,971 0,029 
Singapore 9,3 6,000 0,2522 0,7478 
Slovakia 3,7 4,008 0,7476 0,2524 
Slovenia 6,0 1,550 0,2891 0,7109 
South Africa 4,8 1,069 0,7767 0,2233 
South Korea 4,5 0,314 0,8206 0,1794 
Spain 7,1 2,129 0,0349 0,9651 
Sri Lanka 3,7 0,495 0,9473 0,0527 
Sweden 9,3 1,745 0,0574 0,9426 
Switzerland 8,5 1,606 0,0189 0,9811 
Taiwan, China 5,6 0,350 0,5 0,5 
Tanzania 2,7 1,668 0,9877 0,0123 
Thailand 3,2 0,858 0,9886 0,0114 
Trinidad and Tobago 4,9 3,886 0,5755 0,4245 
Tunisia 4,8 1,417 0,7747 0,2253 
Turkey 3,2 0,418 0,9627 0,0373 
Uganda 2,1 2,137 0,9485 0,0515 
Ukraine 2,4 1,110 0,9779 0,0221 
United Kingdom 8,7 0,980 0,047 0,953 
United States 7,7 0,396 0,0851 0,9149 
Uruguay 5,1 0,893 0,6726 0,3274 
Uzbekistan 2,9 0,360 0,9601 0,0399 
Venezuela 2,5 1,134 0,9824 0,0176 
Vietnam 2,4 1,923 0,9693 0,0307 
Zambia 2,6 1,078 0,9852 0,0148 
Zimbabwe 2,7 0,069 0,9384 0,0616 
     
Data sources:     
FDI – UNCTAD database; CPI – Transparency International database 
 
 
